"Scientists need not apologize for presupposing the value of evidence, nor does this presupposition render science unscientific. In my book, I argue that the value of well-being—specifically the value of avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone—is on the same footing. There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it."
The obstacle is not in Harris's conclusions of science's involvement in morality, but how he's framed well-being. If science starts directing values to minimize aggregate suffering, it may only be able to influence the foundations of society while remaining out of touch for micro-decisions. This might as well be the goal, but I think we can go further with another starting point. Let me take a death penalty problem. Let’s say one person sentenced is hated immensely by the general public, which could be because it’s a highly publicized, horrendous crime, based on prejudice, or a number of other situations. It may be better to minimize misery by continuing an unjust execution if the feasibility of finding the true offender or pacifying the public is unreasonable. The perceived time to reach a prospective less miserable state could have a calculation that leaves people sitting on their hands instead (for at least a while). So in the end, the fate of Harris's idea is hoping that avoiding misery also maximizes justice and does so in a feasible way.
So, instead of misery I propose a new presumption. I say we move to stability. Stability, borrowing from philosopher John Rawls, means:
- A society's institutions increase the tendency for citizens to do their part - higher sense of justice
- Weakened inclinations to act unjustly (especially in envy of systemic injustice)
The death penalty problem I posed above is easy in the stability problem because the society enduring even large corrective measures (like combating prejudice) have a higher chance for long-term stability. Stability is mindful of time, while its results will have consequences of the minimized misery that Harris desired in his thoughts. Stability also doesn't rank what is good, but demands that it can continue to affirm itself. The ranking is organic and less susceptible to the less intelligent attacks we see on Harris as “racist”, among others. Also, avoiding the worst misery may ask, why is the future more important than today? Why can’t we minimize the misery today? We see now in the US how empathy for future generations can be curbed (ahem, climate change). As Karl Marx said in his rebuttal of utility (which I believe applies here):
Applying this to man, he who would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch.
So stick with stability. Its mindful of our dedication to the future, it maximizes well-being over time, and it is, well, stable.